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Abstract
Online video-on-demand(VoD) services invariably maintain a view
count for each video they serve, and it has become an important cur-
rency for various stakeholders, from viewers, to content owners, ad-
vertizers, and the online service providers themselves. There is often
significant financial incentive to use a robot (or a botnet) to artificially
create fake views. How can we detect the fake views? Can we detect
them (and stop them) using online algorithms as they occur? What
is the extent of fake views with current VoD service providers? These
are the questions we study in the paper. We develop some algorithms
and show that they are quite effective for this problem.
1 Introduction
In recent years, Internet video streaming (or VoD) service has become very
popular. The content includes movies (traditionally distributed via VCR
rentals), news, sports and TV series (traditionally via TV broadcasting),
and user generated content (UGC), like videos on YouTube. Invariably,
these online video services maintain a view count for each video. The view
count is useful to different parties in the video streaming service. To viewers,
it has a recommendation value. To content owners, the view count measures
the popularity of a video relative to other videos, and helps to establish a
value for the video. Popular videos are likely to draw more attentions. If
a video is shown with advertisements, then view count may help determine
service rendered for the advertizers. In the online video service industry,
view count is considered as a currency. Therefore it is important to keep
view count accurate and trust-worthy.
Is the video count always dependable? Apparently not. In December
2012, Google announced that they cut 2 billion fake views from some large
record company sites, because some of their videos were found to be artifi-
cially inflated [3]. As far as we know, this problem is quite prevalent among
all VoD service providers. Since fake view count can directly translate to
financial benefits, it attracts people to make special tools of different level of
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sophistication for view count manipulation. Such tools, or services to boost
view counts, are sold openly on the market.
Video service providers are all aware of the problem with fake view
counts. How they handle this problem is usually not public information.
In some sense, inflated view count is not all bad for a video service provider,
as additional view count inflates its own popularity. But there are good
reasons for content providers to deal with this problem seriously. Truthful
view counts are important for online video service operation. For example,
view count helps service providers to determine the value, hence how much
to pay for different videos. Fake views incur addition load for the provider
which increases its operating cost. But far more importantly, the service
provider needs to establish trust from its viewers and advertizers who help
fund its operation.
How to judge whether a view is real or fake, is actually not that straight-
forward. The duration of a view certainly is relevant, but you cannot say
a view less than a certain duration is definitely fake. The number of short
duration views within a short time also makes it more likely a fake view
attack, but how many views within what duration? If a large number of
short views are from the same user (IP address), it also makes it very likely
they are fake, but again, what is the threshold for the number of views from
the same user? What if the IP address is that of a NAT box, which aggre-
gate traffic from many users? There are other illegitimate ways people use
to attract views, for example, by using an inappropriate title. This makes
the judgement of a fake view even more ad hoc. For Google’s YouTube, it
is well known that When the view count reaches 300, YouTube freezes the
view count and starts a validation process of the views count. It may take
several hours to one day before the view count update resumes. For a large
scale service such as YouTube, detecting fake views on a continuing basis
can be very expensive, and Google’s approach is trade-off between main-
taining view count’s accuracy and its cost. The exact method Google uses
to validate the view count of a video, as far as we know, is proprietary.
In this paper, we report a comprehensive study of this problem. We are
able to collaborate with one of the largest online video service providers -
Tencent video [2] - who is facing similar issue as YouTube and provides us
access to the data needed for this study. We will first review the background,
including a brief overview of the online VoD system and its scale, and a
discussion of the whole ecosystem of the business of generating fake views
- the kind of tools used, how the tools or services are provided, and the
motivation for different parties. This will be done in Section 2, in which we
will also give a more technical description and discussion of the techniques
in generating fake views1. Our main results concern algorithms to detect
1Note, in this paper our definition of fake view is limited to views generated by some
kind of robot rather than a normal view from a human viewer. In YouTube, they may
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fake views, which in turn can be considered effectively a definition of fake
view. The results are reported in Section 3 and 4 for offline algorithms and
online algorithms respectively. In Section 5, we give some statistics of the
current extent of fake views in the system we studied. Finally, we give a
discussion of related works in Section 6 and conclusion in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 The online video service under study
Tencent Video is one of the largest video streaming service providers in
China. They have more than 45 million active users on a daily basis, and
more than 1.5 million users online concurrently during busy hours. Their
video content includes movie, TV episodes, music/entertainment video, as
well as many short clips of news, sports and user generated content (UGC).
The online VoD service is delivered via HTTP/TCP, served by many servers
in multiple CDN services. User viewing records are automatically collected
using their infrastructure, and stored in a large data warehouse (consisting
of log servers) as shown in Fig. 1. Each view record is keyed by a video ID
and IP address of the viewer. Our study is based on the analysis of these
view records.
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Figure 1: General large-scale VoD service platform.
The view records are reported via HTTP messages by the Flash/HTML5
player embedded in the video webpages. This is a common way to collect
information about user experience (QoE) for the online video service. Based
on the reports, the VoD service provider calculates the view count for each
video. The servers collecting the view records are well-connected with the
access ISPs to ensure good coverage of all users. The collected data is quite
massive, which makes our data analysis quite time and resource consuming.
consider all views of a video with a misleading title as fake views. While this is reasonable,
the detection of this kind of fake views is very hard to do without human help.
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2.2 The ecosystem for fake views
In the era of eyeball economy, attracting people’s attention on Internet is a
big business. One way to boost the view count (hence drawing attention) is
to use some software tool to mimic the action of viewing a video. These tools
are created by software hackers who learned enough about how the video
system works to use robots (software program) to generate views. These
tools are then sold on e-commerce sites such as Taobao (the equivalent of
eBay in China). Depending on the sophistication of the tool, it may go for
as little as 50 Yuan (or about $ 8). Others use advanced tools to provide a
service, which charges a certain amount of money for a given number of fake
views. For example, we notice one such service charges 10 Yuan (or $ 1.6)
per 10000 views for a video served by Tencent, YouKu or Tudou in China.
Also, we find there are similar services for YouTube videos; for example, one
service advertizes a charge of $ 14 for creating 5000 YouTube views [1].
Obviously there is a market demand for these tools and services, from
people who are hungry in boosting the popularity of their videos. The peo-
ple who pay for fake views may not be (and usually are not) the pop stars
featured in the videos, but their agents or promotors, or even fans. There
are various other situations when people can profit from fake views, usually
because the view count directly influences monetary settlement between dif-
ferent parties, for example in advertizement, or in joint content development
contracts. For UGC, although the view count may not map to monetary
settlement, some times there is also incentive to boost the view count, to
simply generate attention. So there is a whole spectrum of different motives
and requirements for generating fake views.
2.3 Fake view attack methods
We now try to explain how the fake view tools work. By understanding
how fake views are generated, it helps us to figure out ways to deal with the
problem. The methods we describe are off-the-shelf. Anyone can find these
by simply searching the Internet using keywords related to fake view. It is
interesting to observe that such tools are sold openly, as a way for product
promotion, sometimes with the claim that they do not disrupt the video
service.
From what are advertized for sale on the market, we found two types
of tools, with significant price differentiation. The simple tool makes a
direct emulation of video viewing from a browser. The tool generates HTTP
requests to actually download part of the video. This is repeated many
times, to generate large number of views. While this method makes a good
emulation of the real viewing action, it takes up quite a bit of resources, and
its speed of increasing view counts is limited. From our observation, this
kind of tool typically generates on the order a few thousands of views per
4
day.
The second method is more sophisticated. For the online video service
in our study (perhaps others as well), the view count is incremented when
the player sends a report about the viewing session to the log server, rather
than when the user requests for the video initially. With this knowledge,
the tool creator simply needs to figure out the format of the view report to
send fake view reports repeatedly to generate fake views. Since this method
avoids any video downloading, it can generate fake views much faster, at
the rate of millions per day.
Fake view attacks can be launched using the above two methods from a
single machine. Some times, more than one machines are used at the same
time for the attacks. This may be realized by embedding the fake view tool
in some malware distributed to user machines without them knowing about
it (for example when users visit a web site implanted with such malware).
Subsequently, the distributed malware programs can execute asynchronously
(acting on their own), or act together under some central coordination, op-
erating as what is commonly referred to a botnet. In this case, if the first
method is used, the malware tries to turn off the sound and place the video
in the background to avoid the owner of the machine noticing its operation.
When a large number of robots are involved, this becomes a DDOS attack.
The detection and defense against DDOS is a challenging problem.
Table 1: Attack methods and their speed
Artificial Views Forged Reports
Single IP < 10k/day ∼ 10m/day
Multiple IPs 100k ∼ 10m/day > 10m/day
We summarize the methods in Table 1. Note, high speed of fake view
generation is a double-edged sword - while more fake views can be generated
quickly, it also makes detection of fake views easier. More sophisticated tools
may try to randomize the timing of fake view requests and pace the requests
at more reasonable rates to evade detection.
2.4 Evidence for fake views
An abnormal pattern in a daily view count plot gives us a first glance at the
potential extent of the fake view problem. Normally, the daily view count
arrival pattern is very similar, with the peak occurring some time during
the busy hours, 18:00 ∼ 22:00 every day. We noticed one day that the peak
arrival rate occurred at noon - see Fig.2. By checking the view count reports
around 12:00 on that day, we found that three videos collected around one
million views in a short time. Those three videos effectively caused the peak
arrival rate to shift to noon (instead of some time in the evening).
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Figure 2: Abnormal pattern of daily view count.
Based on further study of the log records, we found that the fake view at-
tack on this day used forged view reports generated from multiple machines.
Specifically, we found records of viewing reports sent to the log server from
several different machines at random rates. The arrival of fake view reports
was turned off and then back on irregularly, lasted around 3 hours. The ag-
gregate rate of these fake view reports was around one million views within
two hours on that day.
This incident led us to study more systematic methods for detecting
fake views. Our main results concern offline detection, assuming all data
in a day in the data warehouse are available for use. We will also briefly
discuss online detection.
3 Fake View Detection
Generally speaking, there is no ground truth to definitively tell if a view re-
quest (or report) is real (initiated by a real user) or fake (initiated by robot).
But many behavioral statistics can provide strong evidence to distinguish
a fake view from a real one. So statistical analysis and machine learning
methods are used to study this type of problems.
3.1 Features useful for detection
In machine learning, a feature is an individually measurable heuristic prop-
erty of a phenomenon being observed [22]. By choosing discriminating and
independent features, different scenarios (e.g. real of fake view) can be clas-
sified based on the features.
For detecting fake views, the most useful features include the number of
times a particular video has been viewed by a user, within a short period
of time. For example, if a user views a particular video for over a thousand
times within an hour, it may quite reasonable to conclude that that user
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is in the process of generating fake views, most likely using a robot rather
than manually, given the high speed. The problem, however, is that the on-
line video services typically do not require user authentication for accessing
videos, at least of free services. Besides, there is always privacy concerns
with tracking users on the Internet.
Without user identification, we can collect behavioral statistics of re-
quests and reports sent in from the same IP address. The IP-address based
features, however, are not as reliable as user-based features for fake view
detection. One reason is that a single public IP address may be shared
by many users because of the use of Network Address Translation (NAT).
Furthermore, IP addresses are often dynamically allocated to users by ISP;
so even during the course of a day, a user may have used multiple different
public IP addresses to connect to the Internet. Much of our results in this
paper are about how to reliably use IP address-based features to classify
fake views.
IP TCP HTTP message [uid, vid, timestamp, ...]
Figure 3: View records sent via HTTP messages.
Since the view requests and view reports are sent as HTTP messages
over TCP, the IP address in our records can be considered authentic. Be-
cause TCP requires setting up a connection, the IP address cannot be easily
spoofed (UDP is vulnerable to IP spoofing, but it is rarely used to sup-
port the online video reporting). With the exception of the IP address, the
content of the view report can be spoofed (rather than from a real viewing
session generated by the player). This is the forged report method that we
discussed earlier.
Besides the features associated with user identity and IP address, some
attributes of a video can can be good features for detection use. For example,
1) the type of video: User Generated Content (UGC) videos are more prone
to fake views than others because more content owners are likely to promote
their videos; 2) the release time of the video: a newer video tends to have
more reasons for promotion. Other features related to videos include votes,
rating, and comments on videos.
3.2 Analysis based on user’s video access
Let us first consider the problem assuming we know the video access pattern
by users. A simple form of the data can be represented by the following
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matrix:
Am×n =


vid1 vid2 . . . vidn
user1 a11 a12 . . . a1n
user2 a21 a22 . . . a2n
...
...
...
. . .
...
userm am1 am2 . . . amn


Each row represents the video access pattern of a particular user, and each
column represents the distribution of user views for a particular video. The
element aij is the number of views by the i
th user of the jth video in a given
day. Given this data, the most primitive method for detection is to set a
threshold K as too many views by a single user in a single day. In other
words, aij > K implies user i is creating fake views for video j.
Although as we mentioned earlier that user access records are not gen-
erally available, there is a small fraction of users who happen to have logged
into the system for some other reasons (e.g. social network services) before
they access the online video service, and in this case, the video access records
keep the user ID information. We can consider this fraction of the users a
random sample of the whole user population, and see how well detection can
work given user’s video access information2.
For this small study, we derive the ground truth manually. For most of
the users, it is either clear that they are normal users because the relative
small number of viewing sessions they had during the day; or that they are
really robots because their video viewing history is humanly unlikely (such as
viewing thoughts of videos in a day). For those users there is some ambiguity,
we examined the viewing history manually to make a judgement whether
the user is normal or abnormal. The manual review includes considering the
rate at which the views are generated, the different number of videos viewed
and other behavioral patterns.
In Fig. 4, we plot the percentage of fake view users (based on manual
classification) against the number of daily views. We observe that fake view
users account for 98.2% or more for those who have larger than 1000 total
views in a day; and the percentage is 95.2% for viewers who have more than
300 daily views. In other words, a user with more than 300 daily views is
very likely a fake view user.
The manual reviewing process inspired us to use the entropy function to
help classify users. The idea is quite simple. Normal users tend to view a
few different videos during a day. Because of the variety of videos viewed,
the entropy cannot be too low. On the other hand, if a user made a lot of
views of the same video, the lack of variety means the entropy value is much
2It is possible that people engaged in fake view generation are more careful about
logging into the system, but from the data, it does not seem that is the case.
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Figure 4: Percentage of fake view users for ID users.
lower. The exact equation is as shown below:
Hu(i) = −
n∑
j=1
aij
ui
ln
aij
ui
· I(aij > 0),
where ui =
∑
j aij and I(aij) is an indicator with value 1 if aij > 0 and 0
otherwise. The entropy function provides a good indication about a user’s
viewing behavior. We computed the entropy for every user and plot it
in Fig. 5. Each user is represented by a dot. The x-axis value is the total
number of views for the user and the y-axis is the entropy computed using the
equation above. As evidenced from the plot, users can be roughly classified
into two types. For the first type, their entropy values are above 2 and
increase with the number of views, but the total user view count is mostly
fewer than 300; whereas the second type of users have low entropy values
and many have large total user view counts. By combining and analyzing
the results in Fig. 5 and Fig 4, we find that the first type users with large
entropy are normal viewers, while the second type of users with smaller
entropy are most often involved in generating fake views. This conclusion is
quite intuitive. Those users generating fake views tend to access the same
video (for fake views) all the time, hence their access pattern (distribution)
is quite predictable, which is reflected in having low entropy. We can thus
conclude that entropy is an effective technique for detecting fake views.
Table 2: Manually checking ID users with views > 100
Hu = 0 Hu < 1 Hu < 3
# of users 166 649 1171
percent of anomaly 100% 100% 98.2%
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Figure 5: Entropy for each user identified by ID.
3.3 Analysis based on IP’s video access
Although applying entropy to user viewing patterns is a good technique for
detecting fake views, we cannot rely on having user IDs all the time, for
a variety of reasons discussed before. For each viewing session report, the
source IP address is always part of the record. The question is, can we
substitute user ID with IP address?
The user ID does not map one-to-one with IP address. Network Address
Translation (NAT) boxes are widely used in the Internet for ease of man-
agement conserving public IP addresses. This is especially true in China.
This means many users may share a single public IP address (of the NAT),
as visible by the online video provider. Even when there is no NAT between
the user and the video service, the user’s IP address may be dynamically
assigned. Therefore, we need to re-evaluate and think of new techniques for
detecting fake views.
By slight abusing of notations, we can redefine the user access matrix to
be the IP access matrix:
Am×n =


vid1 vid2 . . . vidn
IP1 a11 a12 . . . a1n
IP2 a21 a22 . . . a2n
...
...
...
. . .
...
IPm am1 am2 . . . amn


Similar as before, each row represents an IP’s video requests, and each col-
umn represents the requests from different IPs for a video. The element aij
is the number of views from ith IP to jth video in a given day. We define IP
entropy based on the IP access matrix as follow:
Hw(i) = −
n∑
j=1
aij
wi
ln
aij
wi
· I(aij > 0),
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where wi =
∑n
j aij and I(aij) is an indicator with value 1 if aij > 0 and
0 otherwise. Note, the number of IPs is much greater than the number of
users with IDs known to us. For a particular day (9-4-2013), for example,
the number of IPs (m) is 15, 649, 601. For a large fraction of IPs (69% or
10, 814, 644), wi ≤ 3 in a day, and their total views account for only around
21% of all daily views. The IPs with few total views are unlikely to generate
any fake views. For our studies, we decided to filter out all IPs with fewer
than 50 total views, leaving us with m = 140, 341, about 0.9% of all IPs.
The entropy of each IP is calculated and plotted in Fig. 6. Again, the
entropy function helps us classify the IPs into two categories. Compared
with Fig. 5, there is an important difference. Due to the existence of NAT,
there are significant number of IPs with both large view counts and IP
entropy.
Figure 6: Entropy for each IP with different number of views.
Since there could be multiple users behind a single IP, we need to better
understand the behavior of view count distribution generated by multiple
users. For this purpose, we need to introduce video popularity, denoted
by (η1, . . . , ηn). ηj is the probability for any view to be for video j. By
definition,
∑n
j=1 ηj = 1. We now consider and compare IP entropy for two
cases. In case one, users and IPs are one to one mapping, i.e. an IP is
assigned to a unique user. In this case, the IP entropy should be similar
to the user entropy. For users, it is rare to view the same video more than
once. With such behavior, we can conclude that
Proposition 1 In our online VoD system, if there is a unique user behind
each IP address, then the IP entropy Hw(i) for a typical user i increases
logarithmically with the view count wi, i.e.
Hw(i) = lnwi.
It is not difficult to see this by assuming that the wi views are for a distinct
set of wi videos. The user entropy in Fig. 5 validates this property.
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The challenge of anomaly detection is for case two, when users map
many-to-one to IPs, which is the NAT case. In this case, what is the expected
behavior of the IP entropy function? Let us first consider the situation
when a huge number of users are behind each IP address, so wi ≫ n. From
law of large numbers, the distribution of (ai1/ai, . . . , ain/ai) will approach
(η1, . . . , ηn). This yields E[Hw(i)] ≥ −
∑n
j=1 ηj ln ηj . On the other hand,
entropy is a convex function. So we would expect Hw(i) to decrease and
gradually approach a limit value determined by video popularity, E[Hw(i)].
However, from our measurement results Fig 6, the IP entropy is increasing.
This is because the number of viewed videos by a single IP is much less
than the video population, i.e. wi ≪ n. In other words, there are a lot
of unwatched videos from a single IP’s point of view. As we increase the
view count, it is highly likely that the additional view is for a perviously
unwatched video. As we increase the number of watched video by an IP, we
prove the following:
Proposition 2 As view count increases, whenever it increases the number
of watched videos, the IP entropy is also increased.
Proof: To prove it, let us consider IP i. Assume that there is an unwatched
video k that will be requested by the next view. −→a i represents the vector of
current view counts, i.e. −→a i = (ai1, . . . , ain). Let ek be a unit vector with
value 1 at the kth position and 0 at all other positions. The IP entropy for
IP i with the incremental view is denoted by Hw(
−→a i + ek) (again slightly
abusing the notations), then
Hw(
−→a i + ek)
= −
n∑
j=1
aij
wi + 1
ln
aij
wi + 1
· I(aij > 0)−
1
wi + 1
ln
1
wi + 1
,
= −
wi
wi + 1
n∑
j=1
aij
wi
(
ln
wi
wi + 1
+ ln
aij
wi
)
· I(aij > 0)
−
1
wi + 1
ln
1
wi + 1
,
=
wi
wi + 1
Hw(i)−
wi
wi + 1
ln
wi
wi + 1
−
1
wi + 1
ln
1
wi + 1
.
From information theory, Hw(i) ≤ lnwi, so
Hw(
−→a i + ek)−Hw(
−→a i)
= −
1
wi + 1
HP (
−→a i)−
wi
wi + 1
ln
wi
wi + 1
−
1
wi + 1
ln
1
wi + 1
≥
1
wi + 1
lnwi −
wi
wi + 1
ln
wi
wi + 1
−
1
wi + 1
ln
1
wi + 1
= ln
wi + 1
wi
> 0
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Thus, the entropy is increasing.
Therefore, we can conclude that the IP entropy increases with view count
as long as wi ≪ n. However, it will eventually approach a limit. The speed
depends on the skewness of the distribution of video popularity. As shown
in Fig. 7, the video popularity is very skewed, which predicts that the IP
entropy curve will not stay a straight line on the log plot, as is the case in
Fig 6.
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Figure 7: Video popularity.
Although we are able to characterize the normal IP entropy curve, this
knowledge does not help detect IPs with fake views, since they do not nec-
essarily have low IP entropy. For example, some user behind a large NAT
generating δ fake views for some video k may not decrease the IP entropy for
that NAT’s IP address sufficiently. The IP entropy depends on the distri-
bution of ( ai1
wi+δ
, . . . , aik+δ
wi+δ
. . . ). So, it is difficult to discover the anomalous
IPs purely relying on IP entropy. Next we take a detour to consider how to
detect videos with fake views first.
3.3.1 Detecting videos with fake view
In addition to the IP entropy, which tells us what different videos an IP
accesses, we can define video entropy similarly, which tell us how different
users request for a video. Video entropy can be used to classify videos with
fake views, which can in turn help identify IPs with fake views as we show
later.
Actually, tracking true video popularity is necessary for content providers
as part of their business. For our collaborator for instance, the number of
videos viewed in a day is routinely more than a million. In order to find out
true video popularity, it is necessary to remove fake views.
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Based on the IP access matrix, the video entropy is defined as
Hv(j) = −
m∑
i=1
aij
vj
ln
aij
vj
· I(aij > 0),
where vj =
∑m
i aij is the total number views for video j. To study the video
entropy, we introduce the concept of IP popularity. τi is the probability for
any given view coming from IP i. Obviously, the value of τi depends on the
number of users behind IP i and
∑m
i=1 τi = 1. Similar to the analysis of IP
entropy, we can derive two conclusions for video entropy which are stated
as propositions:
Proposition 3 If vj ≫ m, the video entropy for video j is a decreasing
function that approaches the limit −
∑m
i=1 τi ln τi.
But similar to the IP entropy case, for most videos vj ≪ m, so we have:
Proposition 4 For a video j and an incremental view from some IP k, if
k has not viewed j before, then the video entropy’s value is increased.
The proofs are very similar to that of the IP entropy case, so they are
omitted. For the practical system we measured, indeed vj ≪ m, so on
average the video entropy Hv(j) increases with total number of views vj , for
a typical video j.
We analyzed some popular videos with a large number of daily requests.
Such popular videos normally attract similarly large number of visitors from
a diverse set of regions and IP addresses, making the video entropy high. If
on the contrary, a popular video gets most of its view count from a few IPs,
it is very likely that some or all of these views are fake views. Thus, entropy
is again helpful to distinguish normal videos with fake view videos.
video


fake views
{
single user
multiple users
normal views
Thus for all videos, we can divide them into videos with (sufficient num-
ber of) fake views, or with normal views only. Out of videos with fake views,
we can then detect if they are generated by a single IP or multiple IPs.
Based on the definition above, video entropy for a given day is calculated
and plotted in Fig. 8.
Perhaps not surprisingly, this figure shares many common features with
the user entropy figure and IP entropy figure. Similarly, all videos can be
roughly classified into two categories. The entropy of the first category
of videos increases with the total number of views while the increase in
entropy for the second type of videos is very slow or non-existent. Besides
14
Figure 8: Entropy for videos with different number of views.
the similarity, we observe two differences. First, the video entropy for the
first type increases more sharply than the IP entropy with number of views.
Secondly, the fraction of the videos with low entropy is much smaller than
the case for IPs. The first difference can be explained by the skewness
of IP popularity distribution, which is plotted in Fig. 9. Compared with
Fig. 7, clearly IP popularity is less skewed than video popularity. It is quite
intuitive that this leads to the sharper increase of the video entropy. The
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Figure 9: IP popularity.
second difference can be explained by the fact that often multiple IPs are
involved in generating fake views for a common video. This leads to more
fake view IPs than fake view videos.
Based on the observation of Fig. 8 and the above analysis, we conclude
that the a video j with entropy approximately equal to ln vj is a normal
video without fake views; while videos with much lower entropy than the
normal videos at about the same number of views are suspected to be fake
view videos.
Videos with entropy close to upper limit or close to 0 are easy for clas-
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sification. The videos with entropy values in between are the difficult cases
to handle automatically. We propose to use off-the-shelf machine learn-
ing techniques to further help us detect the fake view videos, especially
for the difficult cases. Since the problem can be considered as a standard
classification problem, the supervised learning approaches can be adopted.
Supervised learning requires labeled training data to infer a function for
mapping new examples. In our case, however, the daily viewed video is in
the millions, which makes it hard to label each video (fake view video or not)
manually for the training data preparation. Therefore, we have to resort to
the semi-supervised learning approach to deal with our problem. Based on
the features we have observed, the number of views and the entropy of video,
we are able to detect the view count anomaly correspondingly.
The semi-supervised learning makes use of both labeled and unlabeled
data for training. This characteristic is quite suitable for our case: a small
amount of labeled data with a large amount of unlabeled data. We manually
classify 10 thousand videos by labeling them +1 and -1 as for the normal
view and fake view videos respectively. To train the classifier, We use the
transductive support vector machines (TSVM) [20] as our detection model.
Our TSVM algorithm is implemented based on the SVMLight toolbox [12].
We derive the hyperplane from the model by processing our labeled and
unlabeled training data. As shown in Fig. 10, the hyperplane separates the
normal view and fake view videos with linear kernel. We can also replace
it with polynomial kernel to smooth the hyperplane. In practice, the linear
one is efficient for anomaly detection.
Figure 10: TSVM classification for fake view video detection.
With the test datasets, we examine the effectiveness of our TSVM clas-
sifier. We prepared one week’s data, and use the model to detect fake view
videos. By checking the false positive and false negative rates of the clas-
sification results (linear kernel), we find that the TSVM approach is quite
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good as shown in Fig 11. The area under ROC curve is around 0.99. The
error usually occurs for videos located at the bottom-left corner which have
small view counts.
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Figure 11: ROC curve for fake view video detection.
For daily fake view examination, we introduce one more feature, the
release date of a video, to help further improve accuracy. We calculate the
date difference between the day of daily view records and the day the video
is released. We observe the three features in Fig. 12 with different colors
depicting the date difference (darker ones are nearer to present time). It
shows that the fake views are usually generated within a short time (around
ten to thirty days) after the release date of a video. It indicates the fake
view creators have strong incentive to inflate the view count soon after
uploading the video. We add this feature into the TSVM model, and get
the classification result with the linear kernel. Comparing the false negative
rate with the previous one, this classifier has better performance.
3.3.2 Detecting IP generating fake views
By using the video entropy analysis, we can improve anomaly detection for
the IP dimension. As we discussed previously, detecting a fake view user
behind a NAT box is more difficult. To detect fake view (NAT) IPs, we
check whether the videos that IP viewed contain fake view videos, based on
the fake view video detection methods in the last subsection. If a NAT IP
has a great number of views, and many of them are watching the videos
with low entropy values on the video dimension, We now have an effective
method to classify the NAT IPs that have some fake view user hiding behind
it.
We can also use the machine learning approach to improve the classifi-
cation of fake view IPs. For IPs whose entropy values are near 0, we label
them as fake view IPs. For IPs who have large entropy values, we label them
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Figure 12: Adding the day difference feature for fake view detection.
as normal IPs. For IPs with middle entropy values and high view count, we
will check if sufficient views are for fake view video(s). We classify a NAT
IP with fake views as a fake view IP. As shown in Fig. 13, the fake view IPs
can be distinguished with the hyperplane derived by the TSVM model.
Figure 13: TSVM classification for fake view detection on IP dimension.
We implement the fake view detection in two phases as summarized in
Fig. 14. 1) We collect daily view records, and label a portion of the data
based on the effective features as we discussed previously. By means of the
semi-supervised learning approach, we get a TSVM model to classify the
fake view videos and IPs in sequence. 2) In the detection phase, we use the
classifier to get fake views out of all views after preprocessing the collected
data. Also, we are able to evaluate the detection accuracy and error rate
with labeled test dataset in this phase.
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Figure 14: Fake view detection.
Based on the “ground truth” we gathered from the data with user IDs,
we check if their IP addresses are the fake view IPs detected by the TSVM
classifier. For performance evaluation, we observe that 99.08% of fake view
IPs with users IDs are discovered in the fake view IP detection process. The
TSVM classification performs well.
Finally, we give a more qualitative explanation why the video entropy is
complementary to IP entropy. For IP entropy, if a particular IP i has a single
user repeatedly requesting for some particular video k, the IP entropy will
be reduced quickly, since (ai1/wi, . . . , ain/wi) becomes very skewed quickly
due to the increase of aik. From the video entropy point view, however, an
increased number of requests from an IP i may not affect video entropy as
much, since the skewness of (a1k/vk, . . . , aik/vk, . . . , ank/vk) is unlikely to
be affected significantly by aik/vk if aik is generated by a single user. From
the view point of a fake view user, it is less noticeable to generate fake views
through some NAT IP i, since wi is large such that the abnormal increase of
some aik would not significantly reduce the IP entropy. Nonetheless, from
the video entropy point of view, the aik is a significant value compared with
number of views from other IPs, i.e. ahk, h 6= i. That means the sharp
increase of aik will reduce the video entropy Hv(k). In summary, IP entropy
together with video entropy can give a strong condition for detecting fake
views.
4 Online Detection of Fake Views
Online detection of fake views is high desirable, but very challenging. It is
well-known that YouTube needs to pause the view count when it reaches
300 views, so that potential anomaly3 can be checked offline. Such offline
checking of fake views caused much discussion among the service provider
and users.
The difficulty with online checking and detection of fake views is mostly
due to the scale of the video systems at hand. For the system deployed by
our collaboration, it serves thousands of video requests per second at the
3In this case, the anomaly YouTube seems to check for is misleading titles for the video,
which is a much harder problem which probably cannot avoid manual checking.
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peak load. At this scale, one needs a distributed data stream processing
system4 to handle the realtime processing requirements. We feel the simple
entropy approach can be adapted and implemented in this case, and provide
a rough online detection solution.
If even the entropy approach is too heavy-duty, a simpler online algo-
rithm can also be adopted to catch only flagrant fake view abusers. In this
case, it is possible to keep some hash tables completely in memory, keeping
track of only the number of views and the number of videos an IP accesses.
Based on these simple attributes, a rule-based approach can be applied to
catch serious offenders. A simple rule may be expressed as simple as follows:
views > K ∧ videos < L⇒ fake view
Other suspicious offenders can be flagged for more offline analysis. This kind
of simple mechanisms makes a tradeoff between the detection effectiveness
and the complexity of realization.
5 Implementation and Case Study
Assisted by our collaborator, we implemented our design for the view anomaly
detection in their real-world VoD system. The fake view intruders are dis-
covered based on our approach. By checking their behavior in data reports,
we can validate the effectiveness of our fake view detection. The real exper-
iments make our approach more credible for application in practice.
We summarize some statistics of the detected fake views based on one
week’s data. Around 5% videos get the number of views greater than 100
in each day, and their total views account for 95% of the daily views. We
select the videos with more than 100 views, and implement the fake view
detection algorithm. As shown in Fig. 15, the fake views account for around
2% ∼ 5% of daily views (for videos with more than 100 views). And the
fake view videos are usually less than 1% of these videos viewed per day.
Although this is not a high amount, as we explained earlier, it can at least
give the VoD service provider a more accurate business/operational analysis
by stripping the fake views from their data.
We observe that most fake view videos are UGC and MV (account for
more than 90% fake view videos), but also some popular TV series (usually
the first episode). For UGC, it is because many video creators have great
incentive to promote their uploaded videos. For MV, it may involve public
relation companies and fans to introduce the fake views. We notice that the
anomalous daily view pattern used as an example (in Section 2.4) is actually
contributed by MV videos of one singer. Its attack was from multiple IPs.
We conjecture that the intruder used a distributed network to inject the
4Such as the Twitter Storm and S4.
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Figure 15: Fake view detection result in one week.
fake views. We show some features of representative samples of fake view
videos in Table 3. Video1 got 10552 views from one single IP. Video2 was
visited by 162 IPs, but 99.95% views are out of 6 IPs. For video3, 10 IPs
contributed 63.5% views.
Table 3: Case study for fake view videos.
Type # of Views # of IP Entropy
video1 UGC 10552 1 0
video2 MV 409409 162 1.62
video3 TV 1388461 219584 5.02
Finally, we show some examples of fake view intruder detection in the
IP dimension. IP1 viewed a lot, spread over 3 videos. IP2 had 73347 views,
97% of which are on the same video. IP3 viewed 6366 videos, and ten of
them account for 30% views from this IP. These characteristics are typical of
the fake view intruders. We validate the effectiveness of detection approach
on one month dataset (around 1.2TB in size) assisted by a distributed data
processing system.
Table 4: View anomaly detection example for IPs.
Type # of Views # of Videos Entropy
IP1 single 228701 3 0.59
IP2 single 73347 4 0.13
IP3 NAT 6366 1415 5.71
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6 Related Works
Network anomaly detection attracted a lot interest from commercial con-
cerns as well as academic research. Many works [5, 13, 16] study the flow
level and traffic level anomalies for network monitoring and network secu-
rity. In contrast, our work focus on the view count analytic issue at the
application layer for online video service.
There appears to be similar issues whenever one wants to attract eyeballs
on the Internet. [7] detects fake accounts on online social networks (OSN).
It ranks users according to their perceived likelihood of being fake based on
social graph properties. By deploying their method on the largest OSN of
Spain, ∼90% of the 200K accounts are discovered as most likely to be fake.
The use of entropy function has been proposed for anomaly detection
problems before. In [15], the authors propose to use several information-
theoretic measures for network anomaly detection. The entropy measures
are applied to Unix system call data, BSM data, and network tcpdump
data to illustrate the utilities. [10] uses two-phase entropy measures to
detect network anomalies by comparing the current network traffic against a
baseline distribution. A Maximum Entropy principle is applied to estimate
the distribution for normal network operation using pre-labeled training
data. Then the relative entropy of the network traffic is applied with respect
to the distribution of the normal behavior. [14] proposes efficient streaming
algorithms to implement the entropy measurement on high-speed links with
low CPU and memory requirements.
Machine learning approaches could be applied in many anomaly detec-
tion scenarios. Chandola et al. provide a survey of anomaly detection in [8].
[11] uses the supervised learning to realize a mapping of traffic to applica-
tions based on labeled measurements from known applications. [9] proposes
an improved K-means approach to classify unlabeled data into different cat-
egories for the anomaly intrusion detection. [17] identifies the challenges for
the intrusion detection community to employ machine learning effectively,
and provides a set of guidelines for improvement.
Statistical approaches and signal analysis approaches are proposed for
network anomaly detection. [6] presents a review of statistical fraud de-
tection. [21] detects SYN flooding attacks based on the dynamics of the
differences between the number of SYN and FIN packets, which is mod-
eled as a stationary ergodic random process. In [4], Barford et al. apply
wavelet techniques to aggregated traffic data in network flows for network
traffic anomaly detection. In [23], Yeung et al. develop a covariance matrix
method to model and detect flooding attacks. In [18], Soule et al. develop a
traffic anomaly detection scheme based on Kalman Filter. [4] reports results
of signal analysis of four classes of network traffic anomalies: outages, flash
crowds, attacks and measurement failures. In [19], authors propose to use
the wide array of signal processing methods to solve the problem of anomaly
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detection. It seems more collaboration between the networking and signal
processing will help develop better and more effective tools for detecting
network anomalies and performance problems.
7 Conclusion
We are fortunate that our collaborator, Tencent Video, allows us to study
this interesting problem using data from their online VoD system. Our study
is focused on fake views caused by robots generating fake video requests or
reports. Our study found effective methods based on the use of IP entropy
and video entropy functions, together with other strong features such as
publish date of a video. We found an interesting way to use IP entropy and
video entropy together to make our technique more effective. We also report
some fake view statistics found in a real-world online VoD system.
There are still many challenging problems for further study. Developing
online algorithms is very desirable and still requires further work. Cracking
the more challenging attacks involving multiple IPs (botnets) is also very
challenging.
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